The Collateral Attack Doctrine and the Rules of Intervention: A Judicial Pincer Movement on Due Process by Cooper, Charles J.
University of Chicago Legal Forum
Volume 1987 | Issue 1 Article 7
The Collateral Attack Doctrine and the Rules of
Intervention: A Judicial Pincer Movement on Due
Process
Charles J. Cooper
Charles.Cooper@chicagounbound.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Chicago Legal Forum
by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cooper, Charles J. () "The Collateral Attack Doctrine and the Rules of Intervention: A Judicial Pincer Movement on Due Process,"
University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 1987: Iss. 1, Article 7.
Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1987/iss1/7
The Collateral Attack Doctrine and the
Rules of Intervention: A Judicial Pincer
Movement on Due Process
Charles J. Coopert
INTRODUCTION
In employment discrimination cases, the imposition of so-
called "affirmative action remedies," such as racially preferential
hiring and promotional quotas, directly and adversely affects the
employment opportunities of at least some nonminority job seekers
and incumbent employees. Because the pool of available jobs or
promotions offered by an employer at any given time is fixed, the
pursuit of employment or advancement with that employer
amounts to a zero-sum game in which preferential treatment of
one person inevitably prejudices the interests of some of that per-
son's competitors. Many, and perhaps most, judicial decrees im-
posing quota remedies are based not on adjudication of the claim
of past discrimination, but on the consent of the parties.1 It is not
t Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice. The
author wishes to acknowledge with gratitude the contributions of John F. Manning, of the
Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, to the preparation of this article.
' During the past four terms, the Supreme Court has decided four major affirmative
action cases involving challenges to racial quotas contained in court decrees. See United
States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987); Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct.
3063 (1986); Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers v. E.E.O.C., 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986); Firefight-
ers v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984). In all of these cases, the quota relief at issue was entered
in a consent decree. The prevalence of consent decrees is also reflected by the employment
discrimination cases found in the courts of appeals. See, for example, United States v. City
of Cincinnati, 771 F.2d 161 (6th Cir. 1985); Deveraux v. Geary, 765 F.2d 268 (1st Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 337 (1986); Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1985); Williams v.
City of New Orleans, La., 694 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1982); Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687
F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982); Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965 (1st Cir. 1982),
vacated as moot by Firefighters v. Boston Chapter NAACP, 461 U.S. 477 (1983); United
States v. City of Miami, Fla., 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. City of Alexan-
dria, 614 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1980); E.E.O.C. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167 (3d
Cir. 1977); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975).
Indeed, nearly 90 percent of the lawsuits brought by the Justice Department under Title
VII in the period between 1972 and 1983 were settled by consent decree. See Maimon
Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness
of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 Duke L.J. 887, 894. And virtually all of the consent
decrees negotiated by the federal government prior to 1981 contain race-conscious remedial
measures. In 1981 the Reagan administration adopted a policy against seeking quota relief
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difficult to understand why. Employment discrimination class ac-
tions are expensive and time-consuming to litigate, and they can
lead to enormous back pay awards.2 In contrast, the monetary
value to the employer of the equal employment rights of nonmi-
nority employees and job applicants is slight. And, in the typical
case, neither the nonminority employees and applicants, nor any-
one purporting to represent their interests, is a party to the case or
to the agreement that settles it. An employer negotiating a settle-
ment in such a case is thus much like a gambler wagering with
someone else's money: he can afford to be extravagant until he gets
to his own stake.
Because the employer's interest in conserving its financial re-
sources may tempt it to bargain with a currency it holds less
dear-the interests of nonminority employees and job applicants
in competing for employment opportunities on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis-it would not seem controversial to assert that a non-
party to a consent decree who is harmed by its implementation is
entitled to a full and fair opportunity to have his legal objections
to the decree's requirements adjudicated on the merits. Yet the
federal courts, with one exception,3 have consistently dismissed
such actions as "impermissible collateral attacks" on consent
decrees.4
When coupled with the restrictions on intervention, which are
related to considerations of standing and timeliness, application of
the "collateral attack" doctrine typically precludes any judicial
in employment discrimination cases.
2 See, for example, United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 15 FEP Cases 1385
(W.D. Okla. 1977), aff'd in part and rem'd in part, 625 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1979).
3 The exception is the Eleventh Circuit. See United States v. Jefferson County, 720
F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1983); Reeves v. Wilkes, 754 F.2d 965 (11th Cir. 1985). See also Bacica
v. Board of Educ. of Sch. Dist. Etc., 451 F. Supp. 882, 886 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (dicta).
See, for example, Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66, 68-69 (5th Cir. 1982);
Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 541, 558 (6th Cir. 1982); Prate v. Freedman, 430 F.
Supp. 1373, 1374-75 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); O'Burn v. Shapp, 70 F.R.D. 549, 552-53 (E.D. Pa.
1976); McAleer v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 416 F. Supp. 435, 438 (D.D.C. 1976) (refusing to
allow a "collateral attack" on the terms of the consent decree but permitting a cause of
action for back pay to a male employee discriminated against under the decree); see also
Grann v. City of Madison, 738 F.2d 786, 796 (7th Cir. 1984) (seeing "no more reason to
permit a collateral attack on [a state] agency's order than we do to permit a collateral attack
on a consent decree").
Not confined to employment discrimination cases, the collateral attack doctrine has
been employed in other civil rights contexts as well. See, for example, Samayoa by Samayoa
v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 798 F.2d 1046, 1049-50 (7th Cir. 1986) (public education); Black &
White Children v. School District, 464 F.2d 1030, 1030-31 (6th Cir. 1972) (public education);
Burns v. Board of Sch. Com'rs of City of Indianapolis, Ind., 437 F.2d 1143, 1144 (7th Cir.
1971) (assignment of school teachers).
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scrutiny of the substantive legality of actions taken pursuant to
the consent decree.6 This article seeks to demonstrate that the par-
allel operation of the collateral attack doctrine and the rules gov-
erning timeliness of intervention improperly deny nonparties to
consent decrees an essential component of due process-their day
in court.
Part I of this article discusses, by way of example, a recently
litigated case, Deveraux v. Geary,6 in which the joint application of
the collateral attack doctrine and the rules restricting intervention
operated to preclude judicial consideration of actions challenging a
consent decree brought by persons who were not parties to the
consent decree nor to the underlying litigation. Part II examines
the due process implications of the collateral attack doctrine thus
applied. Finally, Part III discusses some recent positive develop-
ments in the case law suggesting that the collateral attack doctrine,
applied in cases challenging the legality of actions taken pursuant
to consent decrees, is undergoing judicial reexamination.
I. DEVERAUX v. GEARY
In Deveraux v. Geary,7 the plaintiffs, five white police officers
employed by the Metropolitan District Commission ("MDC"), a
Massachusetts state agency, sought to challenge the selection of a
black police officer, Donald E. Callender, for the position of Provi-
sional MDC Police Captain. Although Callender had scored lower
on the promotion exam than any of the plaintiffs,8 he was selected
for the position in order to comply with the "minority employment
objectives" set forth in a consent decree that had been adopted in
an earlier employment discrimination case-Cuibreath v.
Dukakis'-brought by a class of minority plaintiffs."0 The decree
obligated various state agencies, including the MDC, to establish a
special minority eligibility list for each job category covered by the
decree, and to select applicants from that list rather than from the
usual civil service eligibility list when necessary to meet or main-
tain the decree's minority employment objectives for the relevant
See, for example, Thaggard, 687 F.2d at 68-69.
596 F. Supp. 1481 (D. Mass. 1984), aft'd, 765 F.2d 268 (1st Cir. 1985).
7 Id.
8 Callender, with a score of 82, was ranked eighth on the list of eligible candidates,
while plaintiffs, with scores ranging from 83 to 85, were ranked from third to seventh on the
same list. The candidates ranking first and second had been promoted on earlier occasions.
630 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1980).
1o See Deveraux, 765 F.2d at 269-70; see also Culbreath, 630 F.2d 15 (affirming original
consent decree).
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job category. The Deveraux plaintiffs claimed that, but for their
race, one of them would have been selected for the captain position
rather than Callender and that Callender's selection, therefore, vi-
olated their equal protection rights. These plaintiffs have never
had the merits of this claim heard by a court of law.
A. Culbreath v. Dukakis: Entry of the Consent Decree
In 1974, three minority plaintiffs filed a complaint for declara-
tory and injunctive relief in federal court in Massachusetts, alleg-
ing that several state agencies employing persons within the City
of Boston had engaged in racially discriminatory hiring and pro-
motion practices.11 The defendants moved to dismiss on several
grounds, including the failure to join as necessary parties "nonmi-
nority state employees who would be affected by any relief given
under the suit."' 2 The district court denied the motion, but noted
"an arguable interest" on the part of nonminority applicants for
state jobs or promotions and suggested that it would "entertain
motions to intervene from interested parties."'13
In December 1976, the district court certified a plaintiff class
pursuant to Federal Rule 231' to include "all racial minority resi-
dents of Boston who sought jobs or promotions with several named
state agencies."'15 After nearly two years of settlement negotiations,
the parties submitted a stipulation of facts and proposed consent
decree to the trial court. 16 The consent decree required state agen-
cies to appoint applicants from a special minority eligibility list,
11 Jackson v. Sargent, 394 F. Supp. 162, 164 (D. Mass. 1975). The claims arose under
the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.
12 Culbreath, 630 F.2d at 18-20. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(a) provides:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive
the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a
party... if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among... [the]
parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action ... may (i) as a practical matter impair
or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons al-
ready parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or other-
wise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. ...
13 See Jackson v. Sargent, 394 F. Supp. at 173. This ruling was not appealed. See Cul-
breath, 630 F.2d at 19.
1 Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23.
" Culbreath, 630 F.2d at 19.
14 "The stipulation adopted the basic facts alleged in plaintiffs' complaint, and more: a
significant underrepresentation of minorities in several state agencies in the Boston Stan-
dard Metropolitan Service Area . . .and the existence of a variety of state employment
practices and policies which were either racially biased or racially neutral but [which]
tended to perpetuate the effects of practices disproportionately affecting minorities." Id.
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rather than from the usual list of eligible civil service applicants, if
necessary to attain or to maintain the numerical "objectives" set
out in the decree. 17
Four state employee labor unions moved to intervene in the
Culbreath litigation in order to mount a facial challenge to the mi-
nority employment and promotion mechanisms of the consent de-
cree. The district court, however, denied their motions as untimely,
and the First Circuit affirmed.18 In reaching this conclusion, the
court of appeals adopted the four-factor test for timeliness estab-
lished by the Fifth Circuit in Stallworth v. Monsanto Company."'
This test considers: (1) the length of time the would-be intervenors
knew or reasonably should have known of their interest in the liti-
gation before petitioning to intervene; (2) the prejudice to the ex-
isting parties if intervention is granted; (3) the prejudice to the
would-be intervenors if intervention is denied; and (4) the exis-
tence of unusual circumstances militating either for or against in-
tervention.2 0 In making its determination that the district court
had properly denied the motions, the appellate court relied on the
first three of these factors.
Applying the first Stallworth factor, the court of appeals
stated that the unions should have known of their interest in the
litigation almost immediately after it was filed; the major local
newspaper had carried front page accounts of the filing of the com-
plaint, including a general description of the relief sought.2
With respect to the second factor, the First Circuit began its
analysis by remarking that the purpose of the rules requiring
timely intervention was to "prevent last minute disruption of
painstaking work by the parties and the court."22 Noting that the
unions would likely oppose the "central principle" of preferential
remedies, the court found substantial prejudice to the existing par-
ties in the "distinct probability that the intervention of the unions
will destroy the consent decree and force a trial on the merits. 2 3
17 Id. at 20.
'8 Id. at 25. One petition was lodged a month before the consent decree was proposed
and some eight months before the district court approved the decree, and the other three
were filed roughly ten weeks after the decree was proposed and six months before it was
approved. The court determined, however, that none of the petitions for intervention had
been timely filed and concluded that the district court had not abused its discretion in
dismissing all four.
19 558 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1977).
10 Culbreath, 630 F.2d at 20-24.
21 Id. at 20-21.
11 Id. at 22.
23 Id.
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Finally, the First Circuit addressed the potential prejudice
that the unions might suffer if denied intervention. Noting that a
"[c]ollateral attack on the decree will be impossible," the court as-
sumed that a denial of the petitions for intervention might forever
foreclose "the unions and their members ... from challenging the
goal mechanisms of the decree. '24 Nonetheless, because, in the
court's view, the unions had only a "slight" probability of success
on the merits of their claims, they would suffer little prejudice
from being forever denied the right to assert them.15 Judge Al-
drich, in a concurring opinion, questioned how the court was "able
to determine the merits of [the unions'] case when they ha[d] not
been allowed to present it....
B. Nonminorities Bring Suit
It was against the backdrop of Culbreath that the Deveraux
plaintiffs sought judicial redress for being denied promotion on
purely racial grounds. The district court held that petitioners' suit
was "in essence an attack on the Culbreath consent decree" and
therefore treated their action as an "attempt to intervene in that
case." 27 In determining whether to permit such intervention, the
court applied the Stallworth factors.
With respect to the first prong of the Stallworth test, the
court indicated that "if it was unreasonable for the labor unions in
[Culbreath] to intervene ... four years after the complaint was
filed, it is even more unreasonable to permit the plaintiffs to inter-
vene now, more than ten years after the complaint was filed."2
Noting that "the goals and mechanisms sought by the complaint in
Culbreath were well-publicized," the district court could conceive
of no reason "why these police officers were not aware of and
should not be bound by the Culbreath decree."29 The district court
thus concluded that the timeliness of the nonminority plaintiffs'
24 Id.
25 Id. at 23. The court assumed that the district court had determined the settlement to
be "fair, adequate and reasonable ... and not unlawful" and that the entry of the decree
amounted, in effect, to "a determination of probability of success on the merits."
2 Id. at 25 (Aldrich, J., concurring).
27 Deveraux v. Geary, 596 F. Supp. 1481, 1483 (D. Mass. 1984).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1483-84. It made no difference to the district court whether any of the unions
denied intervention in Culbreath represented police officers at the time intervention was
denied. This point is important, for it indicates that the district court's decision did not
rely, as a matter of claim preclusion, on the failed attempt by the unions to intervene in
Culbreath.
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attempt to intervene should be measured not from the time at
which their causes of action accrued, or even from the time at
which the consent decree was proposed publicly, but rather from
the time at which the complaint in the consent decree case was
filed.
As to prejudice, the court believed, as did the First Circuit in
Culbreath, that the Deveraux plaintiffs' success "would constitute
an extreme example of 'last minute disruption of painstaking work
by the parties and the court'" since its effect would be to "disallow
implementation of the consent decree." 30 "Nothing," according to
the district court, "could more clearly prejudice the interests of the
existing parties." 31 On the issue of prejudice to the would-be inter-
venors, the district court again indicated that "[a]bsent some un-
usual circumstance, ... [the] holding in Culbreath must govern
this case."32 Because racial preference schemes constitute an ac-
cepted means of remedying past discrimination in our society, the
district court concluded that, as in Culbreath, the prejudice to the
intervenors is "as slight as [their likelihood] of success on the mer-
its."' 33 Finally, the district court considered whether the Supreme
Court's decision in Firefighters v. Stotts3 constituted an "unusual
circumstance" under prong four of the Stallworth test and con-
cluded that it did not.3 5
Accepting the district court's treatment of the lawsuit as a pe-
tition to intervene in Culbreath "rather than as an impermissible
collateral attack on the Culbreath consent decree," and accepting
the lower court's application of the Stallworth factors, the First
Circuit affirmed.3 6 The court of appeals did not address the claim
that the district court's application of the collateral attack doctrine
denied plaintiffs' right to due process of law. The Deveraux plain-
tiffs' petition for a writ of certiorari was denied.37
C. The Judicial Pincer Movement
The Deveraux case brings into sharp focus the dilemma cre-
30 Id. at 1484, quoting Culbreath, 630 F.2d at 22 (citations omitted).
31 Deveraux, 596 F. Supp. at 1484.
32 Id. at 1485.
33 Id. at 1484-85.
-1 467 U.S. 561, 578 (1984) (invalidating under Title VII a district court order modify-
ing a consent decree to require racially preferential layoffs benefiting persons who were not
actual victims of illegal discrimination).
35 Deveraux, 596 F. Supp. at 1485-86.
3" See Deveraux v. Geary, 765 F.2d 268, 271 (1st Cir. 1985).
37 106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986).
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ated by the joint operation of the collateral attack doctrine and the
rules governing timely intervention. Independent actions challeng-
ing conduct required or authorized by an extant consent decree are
barred as impermissible collateral attacks on the decree, even
though the claimants were not parties either to the decree or to the
litigation in which it was entered. Indeed, the collateral attack doc-
trine requires dismissal of a complaint asserting a cause of action
that had not even accrued when the consent decree was entered.
Under a typical application of the rules governing timely in-
tervention in the context of an employment discrimination case,
the nonminority would-be intervenor is required to see into the fu-
ture, to speculate on what his interests are likely to be, and to as-
sess whether any of the likely outcomes of the ongoing litigation
will adversely affect that speculative interest.3 8 If, for example, the
would-be intervenor is an incumbent employee of the defendant,'
he must determine what opportunities for promotion are likely to
arise in the future, weigh his own personal interest and aptitude
for any such promotion, determine his competitive chances for any
such promotion, and so forth. He must then determine such things
as whether the litigation will be successful, whether it will result in
relief affecting future promotions, and whether any relief is likely
to affect adversely his promotional prospects in the future. If he
concludes (or should have concluded) that the litigation may ad-
versely affect that speculative interest, he must promptly retain
counsel and seek to litigate his claim, even though the claim at
that point has not yet accrued (and may never accrue) and is
(probably) so speculative that he lacks standing to raise it. For
Culbreath teaches that if he delays his attempt to intervene even
until a proposed consent decree is made public, which is typically
when he would first learn that the employer intends to settle the
suit and that his speculative interests may be affected by the set-
tlement, intervention will probably be denied as untimely. 9 And if
he delays his attempted intervention in the litigation until his
speculative interest becomes real and that real interest is injured
"' For other cases that affirm denials of intervention as untimely in nonminority chal-
lenges to consent decrees, see, for example, United States v. City of Chicago, 798 F.2d 969
(7th Cir. 1986) (firefighters); Corley v. Jackson Police Dept., 755 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1985);
Reeves v. Wilkes, 754 F.2d 965 (11th Cir. 1985) (sheriffs); United States v. Jefferson County,
720 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1983) (firefighters); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 579
(6th Cir. 1982); Prate v. Freedman, 430 F. Supp. 1373 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (police).
" As one commentator has put it, "By dismissing [the unions'] objections as untimely,
the [Culbreath] court punished them for failing to foresee the unforeseeable." Schwarz-
schild, 1984 Duke L.J. at 921 (cited in note 1).
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by conduct required as a result of the litigation-that is, if he
waits until he has an accrued cause of action to assert-he will
almost surely be turned away as untimely, as were the plaintiffs in
Deveraux.
Determining the answers to these unknowables is difficult
enough for persons, like the plaintiffs in Deveraux, who were in-
cumbent employees when the employment discrimination suit was
filed against the employer. But the universe of would-be interven-
ors who must predict future events is by no means limited to in-
cumbent employees. Because consent decrees entered in employ-
ment discrimination suits are often operative for a decade or more,
a promotion quota could well disadvantage a person who had not
even graduated from high school, let alone joined the employer's
work force, when the consent decree was entered. Indeed, a hiring
quota by definition affects only persons who were not incumbent
employees when the consent decree was entered. This may lead to
results that are not only extreme and unjust, but also absurd. For
example, a twenty-year-old applying for a job with the MDC police
force in 1986 was eight years old when the initial Culbreath suit
was filed.40 It seems unlikely, to say the least, that this eight year
old studied the Boston Globe each day to stay abreast of the hap-
penings at the federal courthouse. But even if he did, it is clearly
absurd to require that the child then decide whether he wants to
be a police officer with the MDC, and then to demand that he re-
tain a lawyer and seek to intervene. This example simply illus-
trates the obvious: that it is unreasonable to require any such per-
son (1) to be aware of the lawsuit and the decree imposing a hiring
quota, (2) to predict his interest in someday seeking a job with the
defendant employer, (3) to assess the likely effect of the hiring
quota on that interest, and (4) to make the host of other specula-
tive judgments about future events required under current rules
governing the timeliness of intervention.41
The would-be intervenor's problems do not end, however, with
40 The consent decree in Culbreath could bind a person who did not subscribe to or
read any major Boston newspaper or even someone who was not living in Boston in 1974.
4' This point is vividly illustrated by the case of Ronald Ashley, one of the plaintiffs in
Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982). Ashley did not apply for employ-
ment as a police officer until several months after the consent decree was entered. After
Ashley was passed over in favor of allegedly less qualified black applicants by operation of
the decree's one-for-one hiring goal for blacks, he promptly sought intervention in the case
in which the decree had been imposed. Intervention was denied and Ashley did not take an
appeal. In Thaggard, Ashley's independent civil rights lawsuit was dismissed as an imper-
missible collateral attack.
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the requirement that he be clairvoyant. Intervention may be de-
nied even to the would-be intervenor who is prescient enough to
foresee future events and to determine that the employment dis-
crimination litigation will likely result in a consent decree impos-
ing relief, such as a promotional quota, that will adversely affect
his future employment prospects. His intervention petition, if filed
before he has an accrued cause of action, is apt to be denied on the
entirely reasonable ground that his claim-that he may at some
point decide to seek promotion and may do well enough on the
requisite tests to be a competitor for a promotion that may open
up in the future and that his interests may be adversely affected
by a promotion quota that may be entered as a result of the litiga-
tion-is entirely speculative and thus not ripe for adjudication.42
The case law governing the requirements for timely interven-
tion thus presents a classic "Catch-22" for would-be intervenors in
employment discrimination cases. When coupled with the collat-
eral attack doctrine, however, the rules governing timeliness of in-
tervention form a kind of a judicial pincer movement, often leaving
the would-be plaintiff without any opportunity to be heard; this is
the quintessential denial of due process. 43
II. DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS OF THE COLLATERAL
ATTACK DOCTRINE
A. The Fundamental Principles
In Hansberry v. Lee,44 the Supreme Court said, "[i]t is a prin-
ciple of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that
one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in
which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been
made a party by service of process." The Court also declared that
the constitutional validity of claim preclusion depends on whether
the litigant whose rights have, in effect, been adjudicated by the
earlier proceeding was "afforded such notice and opportunity to be
heard as are requisite to the due process which the Constitution
prescribes. '45
42 See Firebird Society, Inc. v. New Haven Com'rs, 66 F.R.D. 457 (D. Conn. 1975).
13 Cases besides Deveraux in which the collateral attack doctrine and rules governing
intervention have combined to deny any opportunity to be heard, include: Corley v. Jackson
Police Dept., 755 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1985); Burns v. Board of Sch. Com'rs of City of Indian-
apolis, Ind., 437 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1971); Prate v. Freedman, 430 F. Supp. 1373 (W.D.N.Y.
1977).
44 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
45 Id.
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This fundamental principle of due process applies as well in
the context of issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel. In Blonder-
Tongue v. University Foundation,8 the Court said,
Some litigants-those who never appeared in a prior
action-may not be collaterally estopped without litigat-
ing the issue. They have never had a chance to present
their evidence and arguments on the claim. Due process
prohibits estopping them despite one or more existing
adjudications of the identical issue which stand squarely
against their position.
This elaboration of the due process principles set out in Hansberry
makes it abundantly clear that the right to have one's day in court
is a personal right. Even if the identical issue has been decided
against the position of a litigant in another proceeding, that liti-
gant cannot be prevented from having his own "full and fair op-
portunity to litigate. 47 In Parklane Hosiery Co. v Shore, 4 the Su-
preme Court distilled the teachings of Blonder-Tongue and
Hansberry into the general statement that "[i]t is a violation of
due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not
a party or a privy and therefore has never had an opportunity to
be heard."
It follows from these elementary due process principles that a
party to a suit cannot be required to settle his claims on terms
dictated by the other parties. Indeed, waiver of the right to litigate
is the quid pro quo for settling: when a party "has, by the decree,
waived his right to litigate the issues raised, a right guaranteed to
him by the Due Process Clause, the conditions upon which he has
given that waiver must be respected . .
46 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971).
17 Id. See also Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, 18 Fed-
eral Practice and Procedure § 4449 at 417 (1981) ("Our deep-rooted historic tradition that
everyone should have his own day in court draws from clear experience with the general
fallibility of litigation and with the specific distortions of judgment that arise from the very
identity of the parties.").
48 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979).
United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971) (emphasis added). See also
United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1964); Hughes v. United States,
342 U.S. 353, 358 (1952). Compare W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 771
(1983) ("[A]lthough the Company and the Commission agreed to nullify the collective bar-
gaining agreement's seniority provisions, the conciliation process did not include the Union.
Absent a judicial determination, the Commission, not to mention the Company, cannot alter
the collective bargaining agreement without the Union's consent."). Just last term, in Local
Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3079 (1986), the Supreme Court reaffirmed
that
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If two parties to a lawsuit cannot, consistent with due process,
agree between themselves to compromise the claims of a third
party to the suit, it is difficult to understand how all of the parties
can agree among themselves to compromise the claims of strangers
to the suit. Nonetheless, decisions invoking the collateral attack
doctrine coexist in some circuits alongside decisions prohibiting
the entry of a consent decree over the substantive legal objections
of a party. Two cases decided within a year of each other in the
Fifth Circuit amply illustrate the circuits' capacity to maintain this
inherent contradiction.
The first case, United States v. City of Miami, Fla.,50 decided
en banc, involved a suit brought by the United States against the
City, the Fraternal Order of Police ("the Union"), and others, al-
leging that the defendants had engaged in unlawful employment
discrimination. The United States and the City entered into a
comprehensive consent decree to which the Union objected, argu-
ing that certain provisions of the decree conflicted with the rights
of the Union and its members under a preexisting collective bar-
gaining agreement between the Union and the City. The district
court approved and entered the consent decree over the union's
objection.
The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded. It noted that the
district court had properly approved the decree "[i]nsofar as the
decree [did] not affect the nonconsenting party and its members,
or [contain] provisions to which they [did] not object;" but the
court held that "parts of the decree [did] affect the third party
who did not consent to it, and these parts [could not] properly be
included in a valid consent decree." 51
In analyzing the decree, the City of Miami court determined
that its quota provisions regarding promotions conflicted with the
Union's collective bargaining rights. Although the collective bar-
gaining agreement was silent on promotions, it incorporated mu-
nicipal ordinances which provided that eligibility for promotion
was determined solely on the basis of the employee's score on a
civil service test. The consent decree's promotional provisions thus
parties who choose to resolve litigation through settlement may not dispose of the
claims of a third party, and a fortiori may not impose duties or obligations on a
third party, without that party's agreement. A court's approval of a consent decree
between some of the parties therefore cannot dispose of the valid claims of non-
consenting intervenors; if properly raised, these claims remain and may be liti-
gated by the intervenor.
50 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981).
51 Id. at 442.
[1987:
JUDICIAL PINCER MOVEMENT
prejudiced the Union and its members by "alter[ing] its contrac-
tual rights and depart[ing] from the governmental neutrality to ra-
cial and sexual differences that is the fundament of the fourteenth
amendment in order to redress past discrimination." 2 Because
"[a] party potentially prejudiced by the decree has a right to a ju-
dicial determination of the merits of its objection, ' 53 the court or-
dered that the decree be modified to delete the provisions concern-
ing the promotion of police officers and that the case be remanded
for trial on the claims of promotion discrimination put forward by
the United States.
Less than one year later, in Thaggard v. City of Jackson,4 a
panel of the same court relied on the collateral attack doctrine to
dismiss a suit brought by two nonminority plaintiffs seeking to
mount an equal protection and Title VII challenge to the racially
discriminatory hiring and promotion "goals" contained in a con-
sent decree, and also denied their motions to intervene as un-
timely.55 Neither of the plaintiffs had participated in the underly-
ing lawsuit or the formulation of the consent decree. Nonetheless,
likening the plaintiffs' suit to a "mortar attack on the validity of
the [consent decree],"56 the court dismissed the suit as an imper-
missible collateral attack. The court's opinion in Thaggard makes
no reference to the City of Miami case.57
The only apparent distinction between the Union in City of
Miami and the plaintiffs in Thaggard, Deveraux, and the other
collateral attack cases is the Union's status as a party to the con-
sent decree suit. Accordingly, harmonizing the collateral attack
cases with the due process analysis reflected in City of Miami re-
quires acceptance of one of two theories. Under the first theory,
the plaintiffs in the collateral attack cases are viewed as de facto
52 Id. at 447.
" Id.
687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982).
55 See Corley v. Jackson Police Dept., 755 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1985).
56 687 F.2d at 69.
57 The Fifth Circuit has still not come to grips with this conflict. In E.E.O.C. v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 714 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1983), the court refused to enforce a conciliation agree-
ment when such enforcement would affect persons who had not consented to the agreement
and were prejudiced by its terms. The agreement granted retroactive seniority to some
workers and, therefore, infringed on the seniority rights of other employees. In refusing to
enforce the seniority provisions against a noncomplying employer, the court stated that
"such retroactive seniority cannot properly be granted in the absence of either the Union's
consent or an adjudication, in which the Union has the opportunity to participate, on the
merits of discrimination claims." Id. at 580. Nowhere did the Safeway Stores court allude to
the Thaggard court's refusal to allow a challenge to a consent decree by a nonconsenting
nonparty whose interests had been seriously prejudiced by the decree.
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parties to the consent decree by virtue of the adequate representa-
tion of their interests in the suit by a party that consented to the
decree. The second theory is in the nature of a laches argument;
the plaintiffs were obliged to seek intervention in the consent de-
cree suit as soon as they learned (or should have learned) of its
pendency. Neither theory withstands scrutiny.
B. The "Adequate Representation" Theory of Preclusion
Under the "adequate representation" theory, a nonparty may
be precluded from litigating a claim where an adequate representa-
tive of the nonparty's interests participated in an earlier lawsuit
relating to the claim. 8 The theory appears to rest upon dicta in
Hansberry to the effect that, consistent with due process, "mem-
bers of a class not present as parties to the litigation may be bound
by the judgment where they are in fact adequately represented by
parties who are present. ' 59 This, however, must be read in conjunc-
tion with the Hansberry Court's further statement that nonparties
to a lawsuit may be bound by the result only if the court employs
procedures that "fairly [ensure] the protection of the interests of
the absent parties who are to be bound by [the judgment]. 6 0
No such procedures have been employed in the collateral at-
tack cases. None of the leading decisions invoking the collateral
attack doctrine asks whether the interests of the nonminority
plaintiffs had been represented at all by parties in the underlying
litigation.6 1 Even if the courts in these cases had inquired into the
adequacy of representation provided by the actual parties tQ the
consent decree, it would be difficult to imagine which of the typical
parties to a structural civil rights consent decree-the minority
plaintiffs, the defendant employer, or, perhaps, the union-would
amount to an adequate representative of the interests of the ab-
sent nonminorities
62
" See Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912, 918 (3d. Cir. 1978); Southwest
Airlines Co. v. Texas Intern. Airlines, 546 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1977).
19 311 U.S. at 42-43.
60 Id. at 42. See also Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23.
61 See Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982); Dennison v. City of Los
Angeles, Etc., 658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981); Black & White Children v. School District, 464
F.2d 1030 (6th Cir. 1972); Burns v. Board of Sch. Com'rs of the City of Indianapolis, Ind.,
437 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1971); Prate v. Freedman, 430 F. Supp. 1373 (W.D.N.Y. 1977);
O'Burn v. Shapp, 70 F.R.D. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
62 In Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1978), the Third Cir-
cuit considered petitions for intervention by a class of nonminority employees and a class of
nonminority job applicants in a suit in which the court had approved a consent decree with
racially preferential remedies. In denying the motion of the nonminority employees, the
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With respect to the labor union, one could assume, as the
court in Culbreath did, that the "membership of the unions ...
reflect[s] the racial mix" of the defendant employer's work force.
Because the alleged underrepresentation of minorities in the em-
ployer's work force presumably supplied the initial impetus for the
lawsuit, one might further assume, under this scenario, that the
unions would be inclined to defend the constitutional and statu-
tory rights of the nonminority members. This reasoning, however,
is fundamentally flawed. The union is obliged to represent all
members-minorities and nonminorities-competing for the same
positions.
Because unions have a legal duty of fair representation, 4 they
have to face the problem of dealing with conflicting loyalties at the
stage of participating in the formulation of the consent decree. 5
The legal duty to account fairly for the interests of all its members
will likely prevent a union from pursuing the cause of nonminority
employees with the same vigor as the employees would have them-
selves. Commentators have recognized that litigation by associa-
tions on behalf of their members often involves "subtle conflicts of
interest that defy ready detection" and that "[tihe quality of asso-
ciation litigation ... while often superb is also spotty. ' 66 Accord-
ingly, courts should presume, absent evidence to the contrary, that
unions are not adequate representatives of the interests of their
nonminority members in civil rights litigation and the formulation
of consent decrees.67
court held that the Fraternal Order of Police, the labor union of the state police, and a
party-defendant to the consent decree adequately represented the interests of the officers
with respect to any members whose interests were not antagonistic to the union, and that
denial of intervention would not deny due process under Hansberry. Id. at 918. With re-
spect to the nonminority job applicants, the court held that "the [defendant] state officials
would not appear to have had any interest adverse to that class at the time the decree was
negotiated." Therefore, the state defendants constituted adequate representatives for Han-
sberry purposes. Id. at 918-19. For the reasons stated in the Hansberry test, the Bolden
court's conclusions seem, to be charitable, imaginative.
See Culbreath, 630 F.2d at 22.
The duty of fair representation is an implied statutory duty imposed under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953). Ac-
cordingly, the union must fairly represent the interests of all its members. See Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
" Culbreath, 630 F.2d at 22.
6 Wright, Miller and Cooper, 18 Federal Practice and Procedure § 4456 at 493 (cited in
note 47).
67 The inadequacy of the union as a representative of the interests of its nonminority
members in the formulation of consent decrees stems in part from the fact that a union's
leadership may have interests that diverge from the interests of its constituents. For exam-
ple, in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986), the Jackson Education Asso-
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As for job seekers, the union owes them no duty of fair repre-
sentation 8 and has no incentive to represent their interests ener-
getically in the negotiation of a consent decree. It is difficult to
imagine any circumstances in which the union would ever consti-
tute an adequate representative of prospective employees in the
context of employment discrimination litigation. 9
The defendant employers are likewise inadequate representa-
tives of the interests of nonminority employees or job seekers in
the negotiation of a civil rights consent decree. As suggested ear-
lier, employers have a strong incentive to avoid the time and ex-
pense that are entailed in a full-blown trial of an employment dis-
crimination class action. Indeed, an employer's natural interest in
conserving its financial resources is inherently in conflict with the
interests of nonminority employees and job seekers in seeing the
lawsuit vigorously resisted.70 Thus, any theory positing the ade-
quacy of union or employer representation of absent nonminority
employees and applicants in the negotiation of a civil rights con-
sent decree cannot, it appears, supply the due process justification
for binding nonparties to the terms of the decree.71
ciation negotiated a collective bargaining agreement providing for preferential treatment of
minority teachers in layoffs despite the existence of a survey in which fully 96 percent of the
teachers who responded indicated that they preferred a straight seniority system. Id. at
1844-45 n.1.
8 The duty of fair representation does not extend beyond the bargaining unit. See
Gray v. International Ass'n of Heat & Frost I. & A. W. L. No. 51, 416 F.2d 313, 316 (6th Cir.
1969); Southerlan v. Office & Profess. Employees Loc. No. 277, 396 F. Supp. 1207, 1213 n. 13
(N.D. Tex. 1975).
69 But see Bolden, 578 F.2d at 918 (holding that the union "was probably an adequate
representative of the class interests of non-minority [job] applicants" in the consent decree
negotiations).
"o W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983), is instructive on this
point. Faced with a Title VII action brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission, the company entered a conciliation agreement, including, among other things, a
layoff provision designed to maintain the existing proportion of women in the plant. Pursu-
ant to this agreement, the company laid off certain male employees in violation of seniority
provisions contained in the collective bargaining agreement. In upholding an arbitrator's
back pay award in favor of a male employee, the Court commented on the company's di-
lemma of having to pay back pay for an action mandated by the conciliation agreement.
Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court that "[b]y entering into the conflicting conciliation
agreement, by seeking a court order to excuse it from performing the collective bargaining
agreement, and by subsequently acting on its mistaken interpretation of its contractual obli-
gations, the Company attempted to shift the loss [incurred from past sex discrimination] to
its male employees, who shared no responsibility for the sex discrimination." Id. at 770. The
temptation to shift the loss in this manner, to buy freedom from Title VII liability by offer-
ing up the rights of nonminority employees, must be considered too great to trust the em-
ployer adequately to represent the interests of those nonminorities.
1 In general, the concept of adequate representation seems ill-suited to litigation that
ends in a settlement between the parties. It would seem that compromise of the absent
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C. The "Mandatory Intervention" Theory of Preclusion
Another potential justification for preclusion is found in the
"mandatory intervention" theory that the district court in Dever-
aux appears to have employed. By emphasizing the media coverage
of the initial complaint and the likelihood of the Deveraux plain-
tiffs' knowledge of the consent decree and its impact on their
rights, 2 the court suggests that there is a duty to intervene
promptly in the litigation as a basis for binding the plaintiffs to
the earlier decree. This duty requires intervention at the time the
complaint was filed or, at the latest, when the decree was entered.7 3
Presumably such a duty would be consistent with due process
in the same manner as are statutes of limitations. With respect to
statutes of limitations, a plaintiff may have his day in court, but he
must move to protect his rights with reasonable promptness. Simi-
larly, one's right to a day in court may be limited by one's duty to
intervene expeditiously in all matters about which one has notice
and in which one has an interest. Even if such a duty does exist,7 4
nonparty's claim on terms unacceptable to the nonparty is by definition inadequate. Fur-
thermore, in cases in which the nonparty is seeking to mount a "collateral attack" on the
settlement, he has necessarily found the terms unacceptable.
By contrast, when the issues relating to the interests of the absent nonparty have been
litigated to a final judgment, the adequacy of representation inquiry can focus on whether
the class representative litigated those issues competently and free of conflicting inter-
ests-that is, as well as the absent nonparty would have litigated them.
7'2 Deveraux, 596 F. Supp. at 1483-84.
71 It appears that the First Circuit measures timeliness from the filing of the complaint.
See Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1980) (denying motions to intervene filed
shortly before approval of the decree four years after the complaint had been filed).
Given the unsuccessful attempt of the unions to intervene prior to the entry of the
consent decree in Culbreath, it seems as if the petition to intervene would have to be nearer
the lodging of the complaint.
74 See, for example, Society Hill Civic Ass'n v. Harris, 632 F.2d 1045, 1052 (3d Cir.
1980) ("an unjustified or unreasonable failure to intervene can serve to bar a later collateral
attack"). The theory derives from the Supreme Court's decision in the Penn-Central Merger
Cases, 389 U.S. 486 (1968), in which the Court reviewed a number of separate challenges to
an administrative order. Several actions had been brought in different federal courts, and a
district court in Pennsylvania stayed its proceedings pending the outcome of the parallel
proceedings in district court in New York. The Supreme Court affirmed the administrative
order in reviewing the New York litigation and held that the Pennsylvania litigants could
not proceed with their action because they had "had an adequate opportunity to join in the
litigation" in the New York federal court after the Pennsylvania action had been stayed. Id.
at 505. This case has been persuasively limited to its facts. As one lower court has described
it:
The New York Court, where most of the objections [to the order] were centered,
ruled on certain objections to the plan and the Supreme Court merely held that
when it had affirmed "the decision of the New York court," that decision of the
Supreme Court itself on those issues necessarily "preclude[d] further judicial re-
view or adjudication of the issues upon which it (the Supreme Court] passe[d]."
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and "an unjustified or unreasonable failure to intervene can serve
to bar a later collateral attack,""5 Article III rules of ripeness and
standing compel the conclusion that this duty is not triggered until
the nonminority employee or job applicant is actually passed over
pursuant to the provisions of the decree-that is, until the nonmi-
nority employee or applicant has an accrued cause of action.
In order to establish a case or controversy, the minimum re-
quirement to invoke the powers of an Article III court, a plaintiff
must allege a "distinct and palpable injury. ' 76 In this respect, the
Supreme Court has clearly stated that allegations of abstract, hy-
pothetical, or conjectural injury will not suffice to meet the core
requirements of Article III.77 Indeed, in challenges to discrimina-
But this conclusion does not ... rest on collateral estoppel; it is no more than a
statement of the well-recognized relationship of the Supreme Court to the inferior
federal courts and the effect of the former's decisions on the latter. The decision
of the Supreme Court on the issues decided in Penn-Central unquestionably...
"precluded" them from reaching a contrary conclusion or adjudication on the is-
sues resolved therein by the Supreme Court.
Morris v. Gressette, 425 F. Supp. 331, 336-37 (D.S.C. 1976) (footnote omitted) (quoting the
Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S. at 505-06).
Elsewhere, this theory of mandatory intervention has been resisted. See McGhee v.
United States, 437 F.2d 995, 999-1000 (Ct. Cl. 1971). Although in Provident Bank v. Patter-
son, 390 U.S. 102, 114 (1968), the Supreme Court expressly left open the question whether
there was a mandatory duty to intervene, there is substantial Supreme Court precedent
explicitly stating that no such duty exists. See Chase National Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U.S.
431, 441 (1934) ("The law does not impose upon any person absolutely entitled to a hearing
the burden of voluntary intervention.... Unless duly summoned to appear in a legal pro-
ceeding, a person not a privy may rest assured that a judgment recovered therein will not
affect his legal rights."); Gratiot State Bank v. Johnson, 249 U.S. 246, 249 (1919) ("[A per-
son] is under no obligation to intervene, and the existence of the right [to intervene] is not
equivalent to actual intervention."). Whether there is or is not such a requirement is irrele-
vant, for even a duty such as that could not justify barring the likes of the Deveraux plain-
tiffs from challenging the actual application of the consent decree to them. See text at notes
74-80.
75 See Society Hill, 632 F.2d at 1052.
" See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
77 See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108 (1983) (there is no case or controversy
where injury rests on: "conjecture" that police will conduct all traffic stops unconstitution-
ally and inflict injury without "legal excuse"; and "speculation" that plaintiff will again be
involved in such an instance); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974) ("Apparently,
the proposition is that if respondents proceed to violate an unchallenged law and if they are
charged, held to answer, and tried in any proceedings before petitioners, they will be sub-
jected to the discriminatory practices that petitioners are alleged to have followed. But it
seems to us that attempting to anticipate whether and when these respondents will be
charged with crime and will be made to appear before either petitioner takes us into an area
of speculation and conjecture [beyond the purview of Article III]."); Golden v. Zwickler, 394
U.S. 103, 109 (1969) (denying standing to a party challenging a statute which prohibited the
distribution of anonymous election campaign handbills because it was "wholly conjectural"
that defendant would be prosecuted again for distributing similar handbills); United Public
Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90 (1947) ("A hypothetical threat [of
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tory conduct, standing will be denied where the plaintiffs were not
personally subject to the challenged discrimination.78
A nonminority employee's interest in a consent decree con-
taining a promotion quota is purely speculative and contingent un-
less and until it can be determined with certainty that the quota
will actually cause him to be passed over for promotion in favor of
a minority employee. Deveraux illustrates the point. The plaintiffs
all scored higher on the civil service exam than Callender, the mi-
nority officer promoted by the state to Provisional Captain in order
to satisfy the requirements of the consent decree. When the decree
was formulated, which under Culbreath might well have been too
late anyway, the Deveraux plaintiffs-assuming that they were
even employed by the state at that time-would have had to allege
that they would become interested in and take a civil service exam
for promotion, that they would become eligible and rank high
enough on the eligibility list to compete, that they would be passed
over for promotion, and that the person who would be promoted
over them would be a minority officer who had received a lower
civil service exam score and who would not have obtained the pro-
motion but for the terms of the decree. 79 The potential injury of
failing to receive a promotion because of racial discrimination
would have been considered too speculative to support standing,
and rightly so. 80 That one "can imagine circumstances in which
[one] could be affected by" the consent decree cannot suffice to
invoke the power of an Article III court.8 1
Because any possible duty to intervene promptly in the litiga-
injury] is not enough.").
7'8 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-67 (1972) (plaintiff could not
challenge racially discriminatory membership policies of a club to which he had not sought
membership).
" Indeed, the predicament becomes all the more clear when one considers the hypo-
thetical case of the person in high school at the time the decree is formulated. This person
would have to allege that he would decide later to seek employment with the state police,
would become eligible under the civil service exam, and would be denied employment in
favor of a less qualified minority candidate.
80 See Doherty v. Rutgers School of Law-Newark, 651 F.2d 893, 899 (3d Cir. 1981) (as-
serting that plaintiff must show that he "met the criteria needed for acceptance" to law
school before he could challenge allegedly unlawful racial discrimination in admissions);
Jackson v. Dukakis, 526 F.2d 64, 66 (1st Cir. 1975); (holding that one cannot be injured by
alleged racially discriminatory employment practices when one has not even applied for a
job; injury held too much a matter of "conjecture"). But see Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d
956, 959 (11th Cir. 1986) (standing found on the basis that the nonminority plaintiff class
was injured by being made ineligible for the "target positions" because "nondiscriminatee
class members" were eligible).
81 United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 (1973).
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tion to protect one's interests could not require intervention to
protect interests not cognizable under Article 111,82 a mandatory
intervention theory of the kind employed in Deveraux cannot jus-
tify the application of the collateral attack doctrine to deny a liti-
gant the basic element of due process."'
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: A REVIVAL OF DUE PROCESS
Notwithstanding the widespread judicial acceptance of the
collateral attack doctrine to immunize employment discrimination
consent decrees from substantive challenge, there are some signs
that due process is making a comeback. The validity of the collat-
eral attack doctrine has never been expressly decided by the Su-
preme Court. Indeed, in dissenting from a denial of certiorari in
Thaggard (styled in the Supreme Court as Ashley v. City of Jack-
son), Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, the only members of the
Court ever to address the issue, rejected the collateral attack doc-
trine. They found themselves "at a loss to understand the origins
of the doctrine of 'collateral attack' employed by the lower courts
in this case to preclude a suit brought by parties who had no con-
nection with the prior litigation." 4
The Justices believed that "the Court of Appeals ... erred in
holding that a district court cannot entertain a suit challenging
practices allegedly mandated or permitted by a prior consent de-
cree . . . ."s Noting that plaintiffs' "cause of action did not even
accrue until at least a year after the entry of the consent decrees,"
82 Only those few persons who, at the time the consent decree is formulated, are eligible
for hiring or promotion, but under the terms of the decree are certain to be passed over in
favor of a less qualified minority candidate, would have standing.
83 One writer advances several additional reasons why a duty to intervene could not
justify the results in the collateral attack doctrine cases: (1) notice provided by newspaper
accounts of the civil rights litigation leading to the decree is constitutionally inadequate; (2)
nonminority employees may have jurisdictional or venue objections to being forced to inter-
vene in the action; and (3) such a system would offend Rule 19's placement of the burden of
joining necessary parties on the existing parties to the suit. Comment, Collateral Attacks on
Employment Discrimination Consent Decrees, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 147, 160-65 (1986).
84 Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U.S. 900, 901-02 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari in Thaggard). As discussed above, in Thaggard suits were brought by
white plaintiffs challenging certain hiring and promotional decisions as racially discrimina-
tory. Finding that the challenged hiring and promotion decisions were the result of consent
decrees entered in prior cases, the district court dismissed the suits as impermissible collat-
eral attacks. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. See Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th
Cir. 1982). The plaintiffs had also attempted to intervene in the consent decree suits in
order to challenge the decrees on their face. Intervention was denied as untimely, and the
plaintiffs did not appeal. See Ashley, 464 U.S. at 901 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
"' Ashley, 464 U.S. at 900 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
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they also found the dismissal of the claim inconsistent with the
fundamental principle, rooted in our " 'historic tradition that ev-
eryone should have his own day in court,' "88 that " '[i]t is a viola-
tion of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who
was not a party nor a privy and therefore has never had an oppor-
tunity to be heard.' ",87 The Justices found this principle particu-
larly applicable to a judgment entered by consent, for while a con-
sent decree binds the signatories, it "cannot be used as a shield
against all future suits by nonparties seeking to challenge conduct
that may or may not be governed by the decree."8' 8 Accordingly,
they could find "no justification, either in general principles of pre-
clusion or the particular policies implicated in Title VII suits, for
the District Court's refusal to take jurisdiction over this case."89
It is largely for these reasons that the Eleventh Circuit re-
cently rejected the collateral attack doctrine. In United States v.
Jefferson County,90 the Birmingham Firefighters Association and
two of its members sought to intervene in pending lawsuits, con-
tending that class-based racial preferences contained in proposed
consent decrees would have a substantial adverse impact upon
them. The district court denied intervention as untimely, and en-
tered the consent decrees. The court of appeals affirmed, conclud-
ing that under the four-factor test established in Stallworth,1 the
district court had not abused its discretion in denying intervention.
In discussing the third Stallworth factor-the extent to which
a denial of intervention might prejudice the would-be interven-
ors-the Eleventh Circuit considered for the first time "the preclu-
88 Id. at 902, quoting Wright, Miller and Cooper, 18 Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 4449 at 417 (cited in note 47).
87 Id., quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 904. The leading commentators on federal practice analyzed the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Thaggard as follows:
These actions were dismissed "for lack of subject matter jurisdiction," on the
ground that they constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the consent
decrees. The court observed that it was not faced with determining whether the
plaintiffs were in fact entitled to intervene in the government actions. This dispo-
sition is inadequate .... Some means of reviewing individual challenges to the
legality of the decrees must be afforded. The most that can be said for this case is
that it is far more orderly to review the challenges by intervention in the original
proceedings, and that the plaintiffs should have appealed the denial of
intervention.
Wright, Miller and Cooper, 18 Federal Practice and Procedure § 4458 at 148-49 n.38 (1986
Supp.) (cited in note 47).
-0 720 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1983).
I1 Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1977).
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sive effect a consent decree in a Title VII case might have on one
subsequently claiming reverse discrimination." ' 2 Because the doc-
trines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are designed to "pre-
vent the attack of a prior judgment by parties to the proceedings
or by those with sufficient identity of interests with such parties
that their interests are deemed to have been litigated in those pro-
ceedings," a nonparty to the proceedings whose "interests were not
represented" cannot be bound by a final judgment, whether by
consent of the parties or after an adjudication on the merits.93 The
Eleventh Circuit expressly rejected the view that any action having
a burden on a consent decree is an "impermissible collateral at-
tack" on the decree: "We do not follow this path to the extent that
it deprives a nonparty to the decree of his day in court to assert
the violation of his civil rights." '94
Noting that the would-be intervenors' claims of reverse dis-
crimination did not even accrue until implementation of the de-
crees had begun, the court observed that they were now free to
bring an independent action "asserting the specific violations of
their rights" arising out of implementation of the consent de-
crees.9 5 Based upon this analysis, the court of appeals concluded
that the district court's denial of intervention did not impermissi-
bly prejudice the rights of the would-be intervenors."6
CONCLUSION
I agree with the Eleventh Circuit and Justices Rehnquist and
Brennan that the collateral attack doctrine, as applied in cases
such as Deveraux and Thaggard, cannot be squared with funda-
mental principles of due process. Indeed, the principal justification
for precluding actions challenging conduct allegedly required or
authorized by a prior consent decree-to avoid the potential for
inconsistent judgments-can be minimized by a requirement that
the latter action be brought in or transferred to the court.
92 Jefferson County, 720 F.2d at 1517 (footnote omitted).
9 Id. at 1517-18.
9' Id. at 1518.
Id.
96 Id. at 1519. The Fifth Circuit has recently acknowledged the due process concern
voiced in Jefferson County and Ashley. In Corley v. Jackson Police Dept., 755 F.2d 1207,
1210 (5th Cir. 1985), the court noted that "well-settled intervention rules" and the collateral
attack doctrine, when applied "in combination," might "unjustly deny a party his day in
court." Feeling itself constrained by the law of the circuit, the panel suggested a reexamina-
tion of the collateral attack doctrine in "the appropriate forum." Id.
